Contents
1. Introduction
2. Hume’s ethics as an emotive theory of ethics
3. Conclusion
4. Bibliography
David Hume is an outstanding Scottish philosopher of the 18th century whose
views has a significant impact on the following generations of thinkers throughout
the world. His sceptical arguments concerning induction, causation and especially
religion, including his famous thesis that human knowledge arises only from
sense experience and not from rational judgments, shaped the 19th and 20th century
empiricist philosophy. His famous saying that ‘reason is the slave of
the passions’ is a cornerstone of his ethical views largely explains the
emotive character of his ethics.
Hume’s ethics as an emotive theory of ethics
In his works David Hume paid a lot of attention to ethical and moral problems
he wanted to discuss these issues and presented his own particular views. At
this respect it is worth to mention his moral theory basically depicted in Book
3 of the Treatise, titled “Of Morals”. The author basically discusses
the principle issue of his ethics whether moral distinctions are derived from
reason. To put it more precisely David Hume discusses the question concerning
whether human moral approval is a rational judgment about conceptual relations
and facts or an emotional response. On analysing such a dilemma, Hume arrives
to the conclusion that it is rather an emotional response that has little, if
has any at all, in common with reason. Moreover, it is necessary to underline
that T.Z. Lavine in her discussion of Hume’s philosophy points out that
according to him “reason provides the means, the instruments or devices,
for gaining what the passions desire” (1984:180).
In general Hume is very critical in relation to his opponents who based their
ethic theories on rationalistic account of morality. For instance, Hume’s
criticises Samuel Clarke and presents several arguments against his rationalistic
views, the most famous of which is an argument from arboreal parricide: “a
young tree that overgrows and kills its parent exhibits the same alleged relations
as a human child killing his parent; if morality is a question of relations,
than the young tree is immoral, which is absurd” (Frankl 1985:233).
Furthermore, Hume also argues that moral assessments are not judgments about
empirical facts. The philosopher states that it is impossible to find a fact
that can be called immoral for any immoral action that is examined. In other
words Hume stands on the ground that it is impossible to deduce statements of
obligation from statements of facts. Consequently, as moral approval is not
judgment of reason, Hume concludes that it must be an emotional response. To
put it more precisely, a spectator moral approval is a type of pleasure that
cannot be experienced when considering an agent’s qualities, moreover,
this pleasure “produces additional feelings of love or pride within the
spectator” (Frankl 1985:247).
Obviously Hume is very critical about the reason. For instance, he denies that
reason has any important role in motivating or discouraging behavior, it is
just a sort of calculator of concept and experience. What he believes is really
important is what people feel about the behavior. In such a way it becomes obvious
that Hume tends to instrumentalism, which state that an action or ethical notion
is reasonable if and only if it serves the agent’s goals and desires,
whatever they be. According to him, reason can enter the picture only as a lackey,
informing the agent of useful facts concerning which actions will serve his
goals and desires, but “never deigning to tell the agents which goals
and desires he should have” (Frankl 1985:261).
At the same time, it is necessary to point out that in moral and ethical context
such radicalism in Hume’s views is not so radical as it might seem to
be. In fact the philosopher argues that immoral behavior is not immoral because
it is against reason. He first claims that “moral beliefs are intrinsically
motivated – if you believe killing is wrong, you will be ipso facto motivated
not to kill and to criticise killing and so on” (Frankl 1985:295). However,
he reminds that the reason alone can motivate nothing – reason discovers
matters of fact and logic, and it depends on individual’s desires and
preferences. Consequently, reason alone cannot motivate moral beliefs. On the
other hand Hume does not absolutely deny the role of reason since it works though
under the influence of human emotions and desires.
Furthermore, Hume advanced the idea that the explanation of moral principles
is to be sought in the utility they tend to promote. At this respect it is quite
noteworthy to mention that Hume argues that moral spectators approve of benevolence
and benevolence is approved of because it has utility.
At the same time, it should be said that Hume’s ethic theory is not deprived
of some controversial points. For instance, attempting to determine whether
an agent’s motivating character trait is natural or artificial, he decides
this one virtue at a time. For him, the natural virtues include benevolence,
meekness, charity and generosity. By contrast, the artificial virtues include
justice, keeping promises, allegiance and chastity. Paradoxically in fact, Hume
classes the key virtues that are necessary for well-ordered state as artificial,
and he classes only the more supererogatory virtues as natural.
Conclusion
Thus, taking into account all above mentioned, it is possible to conclude that
Hume’s ethical views are based on denying the role of reason and exaggerating
the role of human emotions, desires and preferences. At the same time his moral
and ethical theory is to a certain extent controversial and often justly criticised.
In fact he is not very persuasive mainly because his argument against moral
rationalists seems to confuse questions of moral epistemology with questions
of moral motivation. Hume can hardly be right to claim that from the fact that
one is not motivated to do the right thing, it follows that one cannot understand
what the right thing to do is. Finally his efforts to explain how moral distinctions
arise from human passions seem to invoke the very kind of substantive, non-instrumental
reasoning which he denies in his works.
Bibliography:
1. Lavine, T. Z. (1984). From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest. New
York: Bantam Books.
2. Frankl, Victor E. (1985). Man's Search for Meaning. New York: Washington
Square Press.
